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Abstract—In order to drive effectively, a driver must be aware
of how they can expect other vehicles’ behaviour to be affected
by their decisions, and also how they are expected to behave by
other drivers. One common family of methods for addressing
this problem of interaction are those based on Game Theory.
Such approaches often make assumptions about leaders and
followers in an interaction which can result in conflicts arising
when vehicles do not agree on the hierarchy, resulting in sub-
optimal behaviour. In this work we define a measurement for
the incidence of conflicts, Area of Conflict (AoC), for a given
interactive decision-making model. Furthermore, we propose a
novel decision-making method that reduces this value compared
to an existing approach for incorporating altruistic behaviour.
We verify our theoretical analysis empirically using a simulated
lane-change scenario.
I. INTRODUCTION & RELATED WORK
Driving is an interactive task that requires agents to make
decisions about if and when to perform certain manoeuvres
in the pursuit of a navigational goal. Completing these ma-
noeuvres often requires coordination with other drivers on
the road without direct communication. Approaches to this in
the autonomous driving literature typically presume to have
access to a dense reward that has features that account for the
interaction between agents [11, 8, 12]. These reward functions
are generally learnt or hand-crafted before deployment—a
process that requires manually specifying features that might
be relevant. The reliance on complicated reward functions is a
limitation of existing techniques that could pose serious safety
risks or verification issues.
Game Theoretic approaches are a broad class of techniques
that can be utilised to perform decision-making in problems
involving interactions between agents. While many methods
exist, in autonomous driving literature, it is common to treat
such problems as Stackelberg games [10, 11, 8, 12]. This pro-
vides a computationally tractable method for computing a joint
equilibrium strategy for all the interacting agents. However,
these approaches rely on a known hierarchy identifying the
leader and followers in an interaction (e.g. at an intersection
where vehicles enter in the order of arrival, at a signalised
junction) which, in practise, is unknown. In general it is not
the case that such a hierarchy is known (e.g. during a lane
merge where drivers must simultaneously agree to execute a
manoeuvre). This creates a problem: agents using the same
decision-making assumptions can arrive at conflicting conclu-
(a)
C2
GW C
C1
D (−∞,−∞) (0, 1)
LC (1, 0) (−∞,−∞)
(b)
Fig. 1: (a): Motivating Example; Car C1 (blue) is in the left
lane approaching a stopped car (grey). Car C2 (red) is in
the adjacent lane. Dotted lines depict the options available
to each vehicle; C1 cam either change lanes (LC) ahead
of C2, or decelerate (D) to avoid collision. C2 can either
continue at current velocity (C) or give way (GW) to allow
C1 to merge onto the lane. (b) Reward matrix associated with
the motivating example; C2 would prefer to continue, and
C1 would prefer to change lanes. Diagonal entries in table
represent states where either both vehicles collide or neither
agent’s objective is satisfied, which is mutually undesirable.
sions about the optimal strategy due to disagreements about
who the leader and followers are. Such conflicts can result in
sub-optimal or unsafe behaviour. We propose a metric—the
Area of Conflict (AoC)—for quantifying the extent to which
a pair of decision-making models will result in conflicting
assumptions about who takes the role of leader or follower.
This metric can be seen as a measure of robustness to the level
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of aggressiveness or passiveness exhibited by other agents in
the driving environment.
Using the insight provided by our conflict analysis, we
propose a method for interactive decision-making that requires
less familiarity with the other vehicles on the road than previ-
ous approaches, while also being less susceptible to conflicts.
Our approach makes use of a sparse reward signal, defined
using the intended goals of each road user. By including terms
in the reward function that correspond to the success of other
agents in accomplishing their goals, we are able to effectively
model interactive behaviour between different agents on the
road. This concept of altruism originates in Game Theory
literature. Andreoni and Miller [5] presents the idea of altruism
being a scalar value, α, that multiplies or adds with the rewards
of the interacting agents to influence an agent’s decision-
making by the potential payoffs to the other agents. In the
work, Andreoni and Miller provide three distinct models for
altruism: pure, duty and reciprocal. Our proposed definition
best aligns with the definition for pure altruism. Similar to
altruism in Game Theory, there is Social Value Orientation
(SVO) in the fields of psychology and behavioural economics
[9]. Schwarting et al. [12] implement a version of SVO that is
similar to our proposed altruism implementation in that they
weight the planning agent’s reward, and the rewards of the
other agents according to the planning agent’s SVO value.
II. CONFLICT IN THE STACKELBERG GAME
In a 2-person Stackelberg game one player takes the role
of the leader and the other the role of the follower. The
leader chooses the action that maximises their reward under
the assumption that the follower will behave optimally with
respect to the leader’s choice. For example, using the reward
matrix given in Figure 1b, if C1 were the leader then they
would choose to lane change (and get reward of 1) as, when
the follower, C2, chooses, aware C1’s choice, they will choose
to give way (and get a reward of 0). However, if C2 were
the leader instead, they would choose to continue (and get
reward 1) and C1 would be forced to decelerate. Thus a
conflict can emerge if it has not been agreed in advance
which agent is the leader and which agent is the follower.
In the case of autonomous driving, without any means of
direct communication, or even an agreed upon policy, no such
agreement can be reached. We define conflict as follows.
Definition. Conflict: When players of a Stackelberg game
compute different equilibria due to uncertainty over the iden-
tity of the leader and the follower.
Conflicts can be problematic as they can result in unforeseen
catastrophic situations. In our example, if both C1 and C2
decide on an action under the assumption that they are the
leader, the resulting situation will be (LC,C), and the vehicles
would crash. Therefore it is important that the method for
decision-making has as low an incidence of conflict possible,
so that it is equipped to handle a diverse range of other agents.
In our example it is clear from the reward matrix that the
players are in conflict, and there is no clear way to resolve it.
C
B1 B2
R
A1 (r111, r112) (r121, r122)
A2 (r211, r212) (r221, r222)
Fig. 2: General reward matrix
III. ALTRUISM AND AREA OF CONFLICT
In this section we will define our variant of altruism, as
well as an augmentation to the definition to account for
iterated planning. We will also provide a definition for Area
of Conflict.
A. Altruism
We model the interactive driving problem as a simultaneous
game played on a reward matrix, indexed by actions, where
each cell in the matrix contains the rewards received by each
player if they each chose the corresponding action. Figure 2
presents a general reward matrix where if the row player, R,
and column player C, chose actions A1,B1 respectively, R
would receive a reward of r111 and C would receive a reward
of r112. The grid is 2 × 2 for demonstrative purposes and,
in general, the grid can be of any size M × N where M is
the number of actions available to R and N is the number of
actions available to C, and each cell contains a reward pair
(rmn1, rmn2). For simplicity we focus on the case where there
are only 2 players however, this can generalise to any number
of players. Unless the full index is required, we will refer to
the row player’s reward for a particular action combination as
r1 and, correspondingly, r2 for the column player’s reward.
Pure Altruism, as defined in [5], makes use of an altruism
coefficient α to define the altruistic reward,
r∗i = ri + αr−i 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (1)
where the −i index corresponds to the agent that is not
indexed by i, and r∗i is the effective reward agent i uses
to perform decision-making. If α = 0 then the agents are
indifferent to one another and if the value is 1 then the
agents are cooperating in order to maximise the same reward,
r∗i = ri + r−i.
As an alternative to Pure Altruism we propose the following
definition for the altruistic reward:
r∗i = (1− αi)ri + αir−i 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. (2)
In this case each agent has their own individual altruism
coefficient, and scaling agent i’s reward in parallel with agent
−i’s allows for more flexible behaviours; if αi = 0 then the
agent is wholly egoistic, if αi = 1 then the agent is wholly
altruistic. To avoid confusion we will refer to the [5] altruism
as “pure altruism” and our proposed definition as “altruism”.
Extensive previous and ongoing work has been dedicated to
estimating reward functions and interactive parameters [2, 1,
3, 12]. In this work we presume that the “true” reward matrix
{(rmn1, rmn2)}0<m≤M,0<n≤N , and altruism values α1, α2
are known to both agents. Each agent can then, independently,
construct the reward matrix {(r∗mn1, r∗mn2)}0<m≤M,0<n≤N ,
which they will use to choose which action to perform.
B. Augmented Altruism
Repeated iteration over the system of equations defined by
Equation 2 produces a variation that accounts for both agent’s
awareness of the other altruistic coefficient. By finding the
steady-state of this system we arrive at the definition of the
altruistic reward presented in Equation 3. In the interest of
saving space we defer the complete derivation to Appendix A.
r∗i =
(1− αi)ri + αi(1− α−i)r−i
1− αiα−i i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
This value, which we refer to as the augmented altruistic
reward, is an improvement on our base altruism definition, as
it is a computationally tractable method for accouting for both
players altruism values when evaluating options, whereas the
original definition only accounted for the agent’s own α.
C. Area of Conflict
Altruism can be used to resolve conflict scenarios; in the
example in Figure 1b, if α1 = 1, for instance, then C1 would
get an effective reward of 0 for performing the lane change,
and a reward of 1 for decelerating and allowing C2 to proceed.
However, altruism does not entirely eliminate conflict since, if
α2 = 1 also, then the players are once again in conflict, with
each so eager to facilitate the other that neither can achieve
their objectives.
Let fI : RM×N × [0, 1]× [0, 1]→ {A1, A2}×{B1, B2} be
a function, parametrised by the altruism coefficients, mapping
from the reward matrix to the equilibrium of the corresponding
Stackelberg game for some interactive decision-making model
I . The previous observation indicates that, for a given reward
matrix, there is a region in the parameter-space that will always
result in conflict. We call this region the Area of Conflict
(AoC). It is desirable to choose a decision-making method
that minimises the AoC for a given reward matrix.
In the following derivations we will refer to the reward
matrix defined in Figure 2. Without loss of generality we will
assume the cell (A2, B1) is optimal for R and (A1, B2) is
optimal for C. We further assume that there are no ambiguities
in each agents’ rewards. This gives us the following:
r211 >r121, r111, r221
r122 >r212, r112, r222.
(4)
It is immediately clear that with these constraints that decision-
making on the reward matrix will result in conflict, regardless
of the value of the parameters. Therefore it is vacuously true
that the AoC for the traditional Stackelberg solution method
is 1 [13]. We will use this value as a baseline.
In general we observe that conflict will occur if:
(r∗211 > r
∗
121 ∧ r∗122 > r∗212)
∨(r∗211 < r∗121 ∧ r∗122 < r∗212)
(5)
TABLE I: AoC definitions for various interactive decision-
making models, where we set A = r211−r121 and B = r122−
r212 for compactness. See Appendix B for the definitions of
p1 and p2.
Area of Conflict
Baseline [13] 1
Pure Altruism [5] min(A
B
, B
A
)
SVO [12]
p1p2+(
pi
2
−p1)(pi2−p2)
(pi
2
)2
Altruism 2( AB
(A+B)2
)
Aug-Altruism ln(A+B)(A
B
+ B
A
)− (A
B
ln(A) + B
A
ln(B))− 1
TABLE II: Calculated AoC values for various interactive
decision-making models based on the reward matrix given in
Figure 1b.
Area of Conflict
Baseline [13] 1
Pure Altruism [5] 1
SVO [12] 0.5
Altruism 0.5
Aug-Altruism .38623
The definition of the AoC of a decision-making model
follows from Equation 5, and we defer the explicit derivations
to Appendix B. The AoC definitions for the standard Stack-
elberg Game, Pure Altruism, SVO, Altruism, and Augmented
Altruism are provided in Table I. Table II presents evaluations
corresponding to the reward matrix in Figure 1b.
We observe that the AoC for the Augmented Altruism
significantly outperforms the other considered models. This
means that, in repeated pairings of agents with altruism scores
sampled uniformly from [0, 1], the incidence of conflict would
be lowest when using this model. In general we empirically
observe that, for reasonable magnitudes of AB Augmented
Altruism consistently outperforms the other models. Figure 3a
shows the AoC plotted against A, when B = 1. We observe
that for 0.33 < A < 3 Augmented Altruism achieves minimal
values. From Figure 3b we see that when B = 3.5 this
range is 1.6 < A < 10.4. This demonstrates the effectiveness
of the proposed model for minimising conflict. In the next
section we will demonstrate how this result influences the
ability for optimal control planners to plan and execute optimal
trajectories.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The theoretical analysis provided in Section III demon-
strates the extent to which each method is robust to conflicts.
In this section we show how conflicts can impact the ability
of an agent to accomplish its objective in a timely fashion.
The experimental setup is described in Appendix D, and the
specific dynamics model used during simulation is given in
Appendix C.
The measurements taken during the experiments were the
time taken for each vehicle to get within a distance  of
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3: Plot of the AoC for varying values of A. The Blue
line corresponds to Altruism, the Green SVO, and the Purple
Augmented Altruism. (a) B = 1, (b) B = 3.5.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4: Plot of the average total signed time required for
the vehicles to reach their objective. The trajectory time is
signed using the maximum reward received by either player
during the experiment. Each (α1, α2)-indexed cell in the grid
contains the average result achieved over 25 experiments. The
order of the results are; (a) Altruism, (b) SVO, (c) Augmented
Altruism, (d) Baseline
their intended destination state, tic, and the true reward pair
(r1, r2) received by the players based on the executed actions
(Ai, Bj). This value is computed from the ground truth reward
matrix. To report the results we sum the completion times, and
multiply this by the maximum reward received by either player
for the execution,
Tc = t
1
c + t
2
c
R = max(r1, r2)× Tc,
which encodes both the time taken to reach the goal state
(magnitude) and whether a conflict occurred (sign).
From the construction of the experiment we would expect
that conflict will result in both agents being too passive, or
both being too aggressive. In the former, both will choose the
less desirable action to allow the other to proceed, and in the
latter both agents will pursue their objective, expecting the
other to give way. We would expect, when the players are in
agreement, that trajectory durations should be relatively small,
as each agent has a good approximation for the other agent’s
trajectory.
The results for our experiments are shown in Figure 4.
The x and y axes of the grid are parameterised by C1 and
C2’s interactive parameter values respectively. The colour of
each cell in the grid is determined by the average value of R
achieved over repeated experiments.
The trends of the grid roughly approximate the shapes cut
out by the constraint boundaries depicted in Figure 5, which
provides an empirical verification of our theoretical analysis.
As predicted by the AoC figures reported in Table II, the
baseline method that does not perform any form of altruistic
modelling is always in conflict. In contrast, the three altruistic
planners are able to produce conflict-free plans with varying
degrees of success. The SVO and Altruism methods obtain
comparable number of conflicts (13 cells with conflicts, 12
without). Furthermore, our Augmented Altruism method is
able to achieve the lowest number of conflicts, with nine
conflict cells and 16 non-conflict cells. This shows that our
method is more robust than other approaches to the underlying
levels of altruism that can be exhibited by agents.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we proposed a novel formulation for an
interactive decision-making model based on existing theo-
ries in the Game Theory literature. We proposed a method
for augmenting such models, and a novel metric, AoC, for
measuring and comparing the performance of an interactive
decision-making model. Using this method we demonstrated
that our augmented model achieved better theoretical and
empirical results than existing methods. We also demonstrated
that conflict negatively impacted a planning agent’s ability to
construct efficient, interactive, trajectories, and that a lower
AoC correlated with shorter trajectories.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVING AUGMENTED ALTRUISM
When attempting to identify equilibria in Game Theoretic
problem formulations it is not uncommon to used iterative best
response methods to compute the Nash Equilibrium [14]. In
practise this involves each agent choosing an optimal action
based on the optimal actions for the other agents in the
previous iteration. It is known that if these methods converge
to a solution, it is a Nash Equilibrium [6].
We observe that in the context of applying altruism, an
iterative approach can be used; after each agent computes their
altruistic reward once, they can repeat the process using the
rewards computed in the previous iteration. This gives us the
following system of equations:
rk1 = (1− α1)r1 + α1rk−12
rk2 = (1− α2)r2 + α2rk−11 ,
where k ≥ 0 gives the iteration index, and we assume that
agent i does not iterate over reward ri as the amount of reward
they would get from achieving their own objective, (1−αi)ri,
is not a value that needs to be optimised. Since the altruism
coefficients are bounded, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, we know this system
will converge (we assume that α1 and α2 are not both exactly
1, as this renders the computation unsolvable). We can find
the steady state for this system by solving:
r∞1 = (1− α1)r1 + α1r∞2
r∞2 = (1− α2)r2 + α2r∞1
Which yields the solution:
r∗i =
(1− αi)ri + αi(1− α−i)r−i
1− αiα−i i ∈ {1, 2}
APPENDIX B
DERIVING AREA OF CONFLICT
Conflict will occur if:
(r∗211 > r
∗
121 ∧ r∗122 > r∗212)
∨(r∗211 < r∗121 ∧ r∗122 < r∗212)
(6)
By solving these inequalities for the various methods listed
above we get the following bounds for the AoC (In order to
save space we will let A = r211−r121 and B = r122−r212).:
• Pure Altruism: (α1 > AB∧α2 > BA )∨(α1 < AB∧α2 < BA )
• Altruism: (α1 > AB+A∧α2 > BB+A )∨(α1 < AB+A∧α2 <
B
B+A )
• Augmented Altruism:
(1− 1−α1α1 AB < α2 < BB+(1−α1A) ∧ 0 < α1 < 1)
In all of the above cases it also holds that 0 ≤ αi < 1,
except in the case of augmented altruism, where 0 < α1 < 1.
Each of the logical conjunctions (∧) specifies a bounded region
of parameter space which will result in conflict, and the logical
disjunctions (∨) define pairs of non-overlapping regions (see
Figure 5 for a graphical depiction of these regions). Therefore
Fig. 5: A plot of the constraints defining AoC for various
reward models for the example reward matrix (Figure 1b).
Per the Altruism constraints (Green) the game is in conflict if
the coefficients (a1,a2) are in the antidiagonal quadrants. The
same bounds apply for SVO when θi is normalised. For the
Augmented Altruism constraints (Red) the game is in conflict
if (a1,a2) lie in the region bounded by the x and y-axes and
the red dotted lines.
we can define the AoC as the sum of the areas of these regions
in parameter space. For Pure Altruism, and our proposed
Altruism, these are straightforward computations.The AoC for
Augmented Altruism is given by:
AoC =
∫ 1
0
B
B + (1− α)Adα−
∫ 1
A
A+B
1− 1− α
α
A
B
dα
= ln(A+B)(
A
B
+
B
A
)− (A
B
ln(A) +
B
A
ln(B))− 1
(7)
For comparison we can also perform the same evaluation
for SVO ([12]).
r∗i = cos(θi)ri + sin(θi)r−i 0 ≤ θi ≤ 2pi (8)
By the same procedure as before we observe that conflict
occurs with SVO when:
(θ1 < tan
−1(
A
B
) ∧ θ2 < tan−1(B
A
))
∨(θ1 > tan−1(A
B
) ∧ θ2 > tan−1(B
A
))
(9)
Even though the SVO mechanism allows for masochistic
and sadistic behaviours (corresponding to angles resulting in
coefficients with negative magnitudes), to facilitate comparison
we constrain the SVO coefficients to be between 0 and 1. This
implies 0 < θi < pi2 . We can therefore compute the AoC for
SVO as:
p1 = max(0,min(
pi
2
, tan−1(
A
B
)))
p2 = max(0,min(
pi
2
, tan−1(
B
A
)))
AoC =
p1p2 + (
pi
2 − p1)(pi2 − p2)
(pi2 )
2
(10)
APPENDIX C
TRAJECTORY PLANNING
In the literature the problem of interaction-aware trajectory
planning for autonomous vehicles is often treated as an optimal
control problem, under the assumption that an accurate, dense
reward function is available for the other interacting vehicles
([10],[8],[12]). In practise this is generally an overly conser-
vative assumption, as such reward functions often require a
familiarity with the subject that is typically not available. In
order to demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed decision-
making method we articulate the path planning problem as
an optimal control problem with a generic reward, that uses
the information from the interaction-aware decision-making
models to coarsely estimate the behaviour of the other agent.
A. Vehicle Model
We model the dynamics for both vehicles using a discrete
kinematic bicycle model. This is given by:
xk+1
yk+1
vk+1
θk+1
 =

xk
yk
vk
θk
+

vkcos(θ + δk)
vksin(θk + δk)
ak
2vk
L sin(δk)
∆t
where L is the inter-axle length of the vehicle, and
(ak, δk) ∈ R2 are control inputs received from the planner.
B. Modelling Other Vehicles
To model the behaviour of the other interacting vehicle we
assume that each action available to the vehicle corresponds to
a destination state relative to the state of the vehicle at the time
the action to be performed is decided, t0 = 0. We define the
relative change associated with each action as a (dx, dv) ∈ R2
pair of intended changes in x position and velocity, such that:
~xfinal :=

xfinal
yfinal
vfinal
θfinal
 =

xt0
yt0
vt0
θt0
+

dx
0
dv
0

Following the approach specified in [7] we represent the
trajectory defined by (~xinit, ~uinit, ~xfinal) with a pair of polyno-
mials
x(t) = x5t
5 + x4t
4 + x3t
3 + x2t
2 + x1t
1 + x0
y(t) = y4t
4 + y3t
3 + y2t
2 + y1t
1 + y0
such that
x(tinit) = xinit, y(tinit) = yinit
x˙(tinit) = vinit ∗ cos(θinit), y˙(tinit) = vinit ∗ sin(θinit)
x¨(tinit) = ax, y¨(tinit) = ay
x(T ) = xfinal
x˙(T ) = vfinal ∗ cos(θfinal), y˙(T ) = vfinal ∗ sin(θfinal)
x¨(T ) = 0, y¨(T ) = 0
where T is the length of the trajectory, tinit is the time when
planning is taking place, and (ax, ay) is the parametric accel-
eration at time tinit. We explicitly presume that upon reaching
its destination, the car will have 0 lateral and longitudinal
acceleration. Implicitly, based on the definition for ~xfinal we
also presume that the vehicle’s final heading is the same as
the heading at time of planning t0. We do not define the y
trajectory on the final position, as the change in x-coordinate
and velocity are sufficient for the purposes of defining lane
changing or lane keeping trajectories.
Producing trajectories using this method is computationally
tractable allowing for more frequent re-computation, and also
facilitates imposing speed limit and jerk constraints on the gen-
erated trajectories. The estimated state at any time 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
~x−it := (xt, yy, vt, θt)
T along the trajectory can be computed
from the parametric state (x(t), y(t), x˙(t), y˙(t), x¨(t), y¨(t))T .
Therefore we can construct a discretisation of the trajectory
X−i = {~x−ik∆t}
k= T∆t
k=0
C. Trajectory Planning
We formulate the trajectory planning problem as an opti-
mal control problem where the planning agent minimises an
egoistic cost function, conditioned on the discretised estimated
trajectory for the other vehicle X .
minimize
~x0,...,~xN+1,~u0,...,~uN
N∑
j=0
J(~xj , ~uj , ~x
i
final)
subject to
~x0 = ~x
i
init
~xk+1 = F (~xk, ~uk) k = 0, . . . , N
~b(~xj , ~uj) ≤ 0, j = 0, . . . , N.
~c(~xj , ~x
−i
j ) ≤ 0, j = 0, . . . , N.
where F (~x, ~u) is the kinematic bicycle model, ~b defines the
egoistic constraints on the vehicle, and ~c defines the collision
avoidance constraints.
We let J(~x, ~u, ~xdest) = ~wT · (~x−~xdest)2, the sum of squared
distance to the intended destination state, where ~w ∈ R4
are manually specified weights. This cost function drives the
planner to the desired destination as quickly as permitted by
the constraints, which include collision avoidance constraints
to account for the presence of the other vehicle.
In ~b we apply bounds on the x-coordinate to keep the
car on the road, speed limit constraints, as well as heading
constraints to prevent the car from doing a u-turn on the
road. We also bound the control inputs, (a, δ), to be within
reasonable bounds. We adapt the collision avoidance condition
from [7] and use it as an collision avoidance constraint in
~c(~xi, ~x−i);
1−
(
(
xij − x−ij
rx
)2 + (
yij − y−ij
ry
)2
)
< 0
where (rx, ry) ∈ R2 are the half-length of the major and
minor axes of an ellipse centered on the vehicle.
APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
We run our experiments on a scenario as depicted in Figure
1, with car C1 in the left lane wanting to merge into the
right lane to avoid having to brake, and car C2 preferring to
continue at their current pace over giving way. In terms of
(dx, dv), we define these options as {((lw, 0), 0,−10m/s)}
and {(0, 0), (0,−5m/s)} respectively, where lw is the lane
width in metres. For simplicity we do not include the sta-
tionary obstacle in the experiment, but the values in the
reward matrix are manually constructed, and are independent
of the environment, so this omission does not affect planner
behaviour. We also changed the values in the reward matrix
to be:
C2
GW C
C1
D (−1,−1) (0, 1)
LC (1, 0) (−1,−1)
This does not affect the performance of any of the decision-
makers we evaluate since, as can be seen in Section III, the
reasoning applied only depends on the values in the preferred
outcomes for each player, in this case the values on the
antidiagonal. This does affect the true reward received by the
players, which will be part of our evaluation.
The initial positions of the cars are randomly perturbed such
that either car can start up to a car length ahead of the other,
and offset from the middle of the lane by up to a quarter
of the lane width. Both cars start with an initial velocity of
15m/s, with a speed limit of 15m/s. The acceleration range
is [−3m/s2, 3m/s2] and the rate of change of heading, δ is
bound in [−1deg/s2, 1deg/s2].
In our experiments we evaluate the performance of in-
teractive decision-makers utilising; SVO [12], Altruism and
Augmented Altruism. We use a non-interactive decision-maker
as a baseline to compare the performance against. To make
the results comparable use a finite set of coefficients, and
run identical experiments with each combination (α1, α2). For
Altruism and Augmented Altruism the coefficient values used
are:
A := [0, .25, .51, .75, .99]
where the .51 value was used to avoid stalemates in decision
making (i.e. scenarios where a player would not have a clear
preference, and .99 used to avoid violating the constraints on
Augmented Altruism. Equivalently for SVO:
SV O := [0,
pi
8
,
pi
4
,
3pi
8
, 1]
We solve the optimal control trajectory planning problem
using Model Predictive Control in a receding horizon fashion.
We use a timestep size, ∆t of .2 seconds, a lookahead horizon
of 4 seconds. We use the optimal planning library CasADi([4])
to solve the Optimal Control problem using an Interior Point
Optimizer method, replanning at 1Hz.
At the start of each experiment each player independently
decides upon an action using the same decision-making
method and the assigned coefficients. During planning, each
player i uses the state of the other player, −i, to construct
a coarse approximation of their presumed trajectory, X−i.
Player i then uses this to generate their own optimal trajectory,
which they follow. Once the agent has satisfied this initial
objective, if it is not their “true” objective, as specified by
the true reward matrix, the agent then plans an optimal
trajectory to satisfy this objective. The experiment concludes
when both agents have achieved their true objectives, when
∃t < T s.t. ‖ ~xit − ~xidest ‖2< . We record the time,tic,
when each agent satisfied their objective for the final time (e.g.
if an agent satisfies an objective, but then has to move away
from it to avoid collision, tic is reset). The true reward ri the
planner converged to for each agent is also recorded.
